LLMs in the Wild · Part 3 / 5

What they eat

A model is mostly what it read. So what did it read — and who decided what stays in?

A model has no facts of its own. Everything it “knows” is a faint echo of text it read once.

That reading is — the giant first training run from Book 01, here seen from the other side: not the loss, but the diet.

So what’s on the plate?

Mostly the web. The raw fire-hose is — petabytes of public pages, scraped and dumped as-is. Huge, and a mess: brilliant writing sitting next to spam, cookie banners, and worse.

Nobody trains on it raw. They clean it first.

Every rectangle is one source the model read; bigger box, bigger share. Flip to the filter and the junk and unsafe slices vanish. Amber marks the part that gets cut for safety.

Try it: poke the biggest slice, then hit the filter. Boilerplate, near-duplicates, and toxic text drop out — and the kept pile is now denser, not just smaller.

Cleaning is two jobs

Quality — drop the boilerplate, the spam, the same page scraped a thousand times. Less data, but every byte is worth learning from. Cleaning doesn’t just shrink the diet — a denser pile makes the model better.

Safety — drop toxic text and personal info before the model ever reads it. A small slice by size (the amber one), but the slice you most want gone.

Curated mixes go further than plain web text. deliberately blends in books, code, and papers — a richer diet teaches a broader model. (Sets like C4 take the other tack: just very clean web. Newer mixes like Dolma do both.)

Go deeper: the honest, hard part

Filtering is also where the uncomfortable questions live — and they’re not solved, just argued about:

  • Copyright. A lot of the web is someone’s work. Is training on it fair use, or copying? Courts are still deciding.
  • Consent. Most authors never agreed to be training data. robots.txt lets a site opt out — but only going forward, and only if the crawler honors it.
  • Privacy. Personal info leaks into the scrape. Safety filters catch a lot — never all.
  • Skew. The web over-represents some languages, regions, and viewpoints. A model trained on it inherits that lopsidedness as its sense of “normal.”

Every one of these is a choice baked into the data — and someone chose. Because so much rides on one pretrained base, those choices ripple out to every app built on top.

A model isn’t a neutral mirror of the world. It’s a mirror of what someone decided to feed it.

That’s also why grading them is so slippery — if a test question was hiding in the training data, the score means nothing. That’s , and it’s the next chapter.

Sources · 6
  1. Jurafsky, D., & Martin, J. H. (2026). Speech and Language Processing: An Introduction to Natural Language Processing, Computational Linguistics, and Speech Recognition with Language Models (3rd ed., draft of January 6, 2026). Stanford University. Ch. 7 (Large Language Models); Ch. 10 (Masked Language Models).
  2. Raffel, C., Shazeer, N., Roberts, A., Lee, K., Narang, S., Matena, M., Zhou, Y., Li, W., & Liu, P. J. (2020). Exploring the Limits of Transfer Learning with a Unified Text-to-Text Transformer. Journal of Machine Learning Research, 21(140), 1–67. arXiv:1910.10683.
  3. Gao, L., Biderman, S., Black, S., Golding, L., Hoppe, T., Foster, C., Phang, J., He, H., Thite, A., Nabeshima, N., Presser, S., & Leahy, C. (2020). The Pile: An 800GB Dataset of Diverse Text for Language Modeling. arXiv:2101.00027.
  4. Soldaini, L., Kinney, R., Bhagia, A., Schwenk, D., Atkinson, D., Authur, R., et al. (2024). Dolma: an Open Corpus of Three Trillion Tokens for Language Model Pretraining Research. In Proceedings of ACL 2024 (Long Papers). arXiv:2402.00159.
  5. Longpre, S., Mahari, R., Lee, A., Lund, C., Oderinwale, H., Brannon, W., Saxena, N., et al. (2024). Consent in Crisis: The Rapid Decline of the AI Data Commons. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 37 (NeurIPS 2024). arXiv:2407.14933.
  6. Carlini, N., Tramèr, F., Wallace, E., Jagielski, M., Herbert-Voss, A., Lee, K., Roberts, A., Brown, T., Song, D., Erlingsson, Ú., Oprea, A., & Raffel, C. (2021). Extracting Training Data from Large Language Models. In 30th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 21), pp. 2633–2650. arXiv:2012.07805.
Full bibliography →